


# Problems of Communism

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1987



## **Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy**

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## **Philippine Communism**

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## **China's *Nomenklatura* System**

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# 5

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*Problems of Communism* (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editorial matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism*, US Information Agency, United States of America, 301 4th Street SW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA. Telephone (202) 485-2230.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

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An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI*, *Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales (all Sections)*, *Current Contents*, *Economic Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Index to US Government Periodicals*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *Public Affairs Information Service*, *Social Sciences Citation Index*, *Social Sciences Index*, *Strategic Studies Reference Guide*, and *United States Political Science Documents*.

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Cover: Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and his wife hosted by Egypt's Gamal Abdul-Nasser at a Cairo sports exhibition in May 1964. Photo by TASS from Sovfoto.

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# China's *Nomenklatura* System

John P. Burns

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In its attempt to ensure the success of the Four Modernizations drive, the leadership of the People's Republic of China has made major efforts in the 1980's to revitalize the cadre management system that was instituted in the 1950's and early 1960's and to reestablish control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over it. This undertaking marks official recognition of the fact that the success of innumerable reform initiatives hinges on correcting the shortcomings of the existing cadre system, especially those aspects of it that impede the large-scale qualitative elite transformation required by the modernization drive.<sup>1</sup>

A central target of recent changes is the *nomenklatura* system—the critical feature of the cadre management system. The *nomenklatura* (*zhiwu mingcheng biao*) system<sup>2</sup> consists of lists of leading positions over which party committees exercise the power of appointment, lists of reserve cadre for the available positions, and the institutions and processes for making the appropriate personnel changes. The system is arguably the major instrument of Communist Party control over contemporary China's political, economic, social, and cultural institutions. Through *nomenklatura*, a variant of which is employed by all communist parties in power,<sup>3</sup> authorities ensure that leading institutions throughout the country will exercise only the autonomy granted to them by the party.

China's *nomenklatura* operates within a complex hierarchy of authority. For example, organizations in Chi-

na exist in a hierarchy of ranks. The state bureaucracy is organized territorially. Below the central government in Beijing are 22 provinces, five autonomous regions, and three centrally administered cities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin), all of equal rank. At the next lower level are 175 prefectures or prefecture-level units, and below them are more than 2,000 counties or county-level units.<sup>4</sup> A hierarchy of party committees, extending downward from the Central Committee in Beijing, parallels this structure.

In the Chinese administrative hierarchy, ministers and deputy ministers of central ministries in Beijing are of equal rank to governors and deputy governors of provinces. Heads of general bureaus (*zongju*) at the center are equivalent to heads of provincial-level commissions, and heads of bureaus (*ju* and *si*) of central ministries and commissions are of equal rank to heads of provincial bureaus (*ting* and *ju*) and to heads of prefectures.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For further discussion, see Melanie Manion, "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer, and Removal of Party and State Leaders," *The China Quarterly* (London), June 1985, pp. 203–33.

<sup>2</sup>Bohdan Harasymiw described the term "nomenklatura" (meaning "nomenclature") in the following terms: "a list of positions, arranged in order of seniority, including a description of the duties of each office. Its political importance comes from the fact that the party's *nomenklatura*—and it alone—contains the most important leading positions in all organized activities of social life." See Harasymiw's seminal article, "Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (Waterloo, Ontario), December 1969, p. 494.

<sup>3</sup>For examples from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, see chapters in T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw, Eds., *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1983. For Poland, see Takayuki Ito, "Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland: Twilight of a Monopolistic Instrument for Social Control," *Acta Slavica Iaponica* (Sapporo), 1983, pp. 57–103.

<sup>4</sup>Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Ed., *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng juhua jiance* (Handbook of Administrative Divisions of the People's Republic of China), Beijing, Cehui chubanshe, 1985, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup>See Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, *Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Energy Development*, Washington, DC, US Department of Commerce, 1986, p. 124.

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## Background

The *nomenklatura* system had its beginnings in the early 1950's, and by 1955 a system along Soviet lines had been established.<sup>6</sup> Party committees exercised formal authority over senior personnel appointments, removals, and transfers two levels down the administrative hierarchy; the Central Committee in Beijing approved personnel changes not only of leading cadres at the center, but of senior officials at the provincial and prefectural levels. By the 1960's, China's cadre system had become a powerful, party-dominated one.<sup>7</sup> A recent study states that a personnel dossier and cadre evaluation system was in place in the 1960's and that "cadre appointments, promotions, transfers and removals were deliberated and conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy."<sup>8</sup> Overlap existed both between party organization departments (which made personnel policy and examined and approved senior personnel appointments) and parallel state personnel departments, as well as between these various departments and party committees at different levels. Senior positions at the prefectural level, for example, appeared on the *nomenklatura* of both the Central Committee and of various provincial party committees.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), intense conflict within the party prevented authorities from using the system effectively, and changes of leading personnel became highly irregular. There was no mention of the powerful Central Committee Organization Department in the Chinese press between 1967 and 1972, and its head was not officially identified until 1975.<sup>9</sup>

In the years immediately following the Cultural Revolution, the party attempted to reestablish regular procedures for controlling the selection and placement of leading personnel. Up to 1980, much of official attention was concentrated on the specifics of removing persons recruited or rehabilitating those demoted during the Cultural Revolution. By 1980, however, attempts to deal with the de-institutionalization that had occurred during the "lost 10 years" were being made and attention was focused once again on reshaping leading groups at all levels so that they were prepared to carry out China's modernization drive.

In 1980, the Central Committee repromulgated the list of cadre positions that it managed, and ordered lower-level party committees to do the same.<sup>10</sup> It also reaffirmed the two-level-down principle, and it ordered that in situations where positions on a party committee's *nomenklatura* were to be filled by election, authorities must first submit the names of the nominees to the relevant party committee for approval. Finally, the Central

Committee extended its control to the party core groups (*dangzu*) of central ministries, commissions, and bureaus. These party core groups, which are appointed by central party officials and exist independently of the party committees that also exist in the ministries, commissions, and bureaus, play an important role in the implementation of the *nomenklatura* system. Within each ministry and commission of the State Council, for example, party core groups consisting of three to five people, each with a group secretary (usually the minister or a deputy minister) and a deputy secretary, maintain lists of positions over which they have authority of appointment, removal, and transfer of officials. In turn, judging from the example of the Bank of China, the secretary, deputy secretaries, and members of the core groups in similarly key central institutions were included on the *nomenklatura* of the Central Committee.<sup>11</sup>

Further detailed regulations followed these first steps. Because the numbers of cadres managed centrally was so great, the Central Committee divided them into grades. Grade "A" positions included, for example, heads and deputy heads of party central departments and State Council ministries and commissions; ambassadors stationed abroad; the heads of various mass organizations; party secretaries and standing committee members of provincial party committees; and provincial governors and deputy governors.<sup>12</sup> Positions of lesser rank were designated "B" grade. In October 1980, the Central Committee advised that before an "A" grade appointment, removal, or transfer could be made, it was necessary to seek the approval of the relevant "leading cadre of party central" or the vice premier responsible for the functional area.<sup>13</sup>

This process was not always followed—provincial

<sup>6</sup>Central Committee Organization Department, "Notice on the Repromulgation of the Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee, 1980," in People's Bank of China Personnel Bureau, Ed., *Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian* (Selection of Personnel Work Documents—hereafter, *RGWX*), Beijing, Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, 1985, pp. 324–29, trans. together with other documents from *RGWX* in John P. Burns, Ed., "Contemporary China's *Nomenklatura* System," *Chinese Law and Government* (Armonk, NY—hereafter *CLG*), forthcoming.

<sup>7</sup>A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1967.

<sup>8</sup>Manion, "The Cadre Management System Post-Mao . . ." loc. cit., p. 205.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>*RGWX*, pp. 324–29.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 44. For a short discussion of party core groups (which he calls fractions) and party committees in central ministries, see Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>12</sup>For a list of "A" grade positions, see Central Committee Organization Department, "Notice on the Implementation of Several Detailed Questions on the 'Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee,' 1980," in *RGWX*, pp. 339–44.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

party committees tended to ignore the regulations. Local authorities often failed to make complete reports on proposed personnel changes and sometimes failed to seek central approval before they announced local appointments. In 1982, the Central Committee complained: "Sometimes the Central Committee wants to make changes to the [personnel] decisions of local people's congresses, but because the decision has already been taken and made public, it is not convenient to make a change. This produces work immobilism."<sup>14</sup> No doubt, this situation arose because the Central Committee was unable to manage the thousands of cadres under its authority, causing provincial party committees in many cases to view the approval process as a mere formality.<sup>15</sup>

### 1984 *Nomenklatura* Reform

At a National Conference on Organization Work, in July 1983, the Central Committee's Organization Department presented a plan to decentralize control of personnel management. Authorities proposed reducing the number of cadres directly managed by the Central Committee, from 13,000, to 7,000.<sup>16</sup> When the reform was implemented in August 1984, however, officials reported that they had transferred to provincial party committees and to party core groups (*dangzu*) of the central ministries, commissions, and bureaus *nomenklatura* authority over two-thirds of the posts previously controlled by the Central Committee. Further, officials restricted the authority of party committees to supervision of positions only one level down the administrative hierarchy.<sup>17</sup>

The reform drastically reduced the number of posts directly managed by the Central Committee. In one State Council ministry-level unit—the People's Bank of China—the number of posts on the Central Committee's

*nomenklatura* fell by at least 87 percent (see Table 1).<sup>18</sup> Since 1984, only a handful of the top positions in the Bank headquarters appear on the CC list; most are now on the Bank's own *nomenklatura*. The latter are, however, reportable to the Central Committee. The names of other institutions, especially some enterprises and service units, disappeared completely from the CC list as a result of the reform. Control over the leading positions in them has presumably been transferred to party core groups within ministries and commissions or to provincial party committees.

In spite of the overall reduction in the number of posts on the Central Committee's *nomenklatura*, there was one significant addition—the 1984 list added the heads of discipline inspection groups organized throughout central administrative agencies, giving these groups additional clout in their fight against corruption and bureaucratic abuses.

Over the period from August to December 1984, provincial and prefectural party committees, in turn, moved to decentralize their control over their *nomenklatura* to prefectural, city, and county party committees. The impact of these changes on the number of cadres managed by provincial party committees has varied. For example, of those cadres previously managed by provincial party committees, Heilongjiang retained 23 percent;<sup>19</sup> Inner Mongolia retained 30 percent;<sup>20</sup> and Qinghai retained 50 percent.<sup>21</sup> In poorer provinces, such as Qinghai, there may have been too few party members in prefectural or other local party organizations to carry out further decentralization.

The reform did not reduce the total size of the *nomenklatura*, but rather it redistributed authority over many posts to lower-level party committees and to party core groups. (It should be noted that the inclusion of party core groups on the job title list of the party Central Committee or local party committees signaled an effort to retain some measure of control over lower-level appointments.)

By decentralizing cadre management, authorities sought to reduce to manageable proportions the number of cadres controlled centrally and by provincial party committees. This step amounted to recognition of the fact that the Central Committee in Beijing was out of touch with local needs and sometimes mistakenly overruled the personnel recommendations of local officials, and that the process of review was sometimes a formality, because the number of cadres involved precluded a

<sup>14</sup>Central Committee Organization Department, "Notice on the Revision of and Supplement to Several Regulations on Appointment and Removal Work of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee, 1982," in *RGWX*, pp. 360–63.

<sup>15</sup>Jerry Hough argues that in the Soviet Union, party committee approval of appointments is "at times" a formality. The Central Committee, he suggests, is "less absorbed in low-level personnel work than its *nomenklatura* suggests." See Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 431–32.

<sup>16</sup>The July 6, 1983 work report of the Central Committee Organization Department presented at a national conference on organization work, "Proposal on Reforming the Spirit and Quickening the Pace of the 'Four Changes' of the Leadership Group and the Cadre Ranks," in *RGWX*, p. 114.

<sup>17</sup>*Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), July 20, 1984, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), July 23, 1984, pp. K/1–6.

<sup>18</sup>The precise number depends on how many deputy, vice-, and advisory positions there are in the Bank.

<sup>19</sup>Radio Harbin, Aug. 14, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 15, 1984, p. S/2.

<sup>20</sup>Radio Hohhot, Oct. 13, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 15, 1984, p. R/6.

<sup>21</sup>Radio Xining, Aug. 5, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 6, 1984, p. T/1.

**Table 1: The 1984 Decentralization of China's *Nomenklatura* System—  
The Case of the People's Bank of China**

**1. Excerpts from "Job Title List of Cadre Positions Managed by the Party Central Committee, 1979"**

Position	Unit
President, vice presidents, advisers	Headquarters
Head, deputy heads, advisers	Political Department
Head, deputy heads	General Office
Head, deputy heads	Administrative Bureau ( <i>xingzheng si</i> )
Heads, deputy heads	Various bureaus ( <i>ju</i> )
Director, deputy directors	Counsellors Office
Director, deputy directors	Finance Research Institute
Editor-in-chief, deputy editors-in-chief	China Financial Magazine Publishing House
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, general manager (bureau head), deputy general managers (deputy bureau heads)	People's Insurance Corporation of China (People's Bank of China Insurance Professional Management Bureau)
Advisers	Various bureau-level ( <i>si, ju</i> ) units
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, general manager (bureau head), deputy general managers (deputy bureau heads), advisers	People's Bank of China Printing Corporation (People's Bank of China Printing Management Bureau)
Party secretaries, managers ( <i>jingli</i> ), factory managers ( <i>changzhang</i> )	Donghe Printing Company and factories No. 541 and No. 542
Heads	Bank branches of various provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
Party secretaries, presidents	Institutions of higher learning managed by Bank headquarters

**2. Excerpts from "Job Title List of Cadre Positions Managed by the Party Central Committee, 1984"**

Position	Unit
Chairman, vice-chairmen, president, vice presidents	Bank headquarters
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Bank
Head	Discipline inspection group of Bank
Head	Political Department of Bank

**3. Excerpts from "Job Title List of Cadre Positions to be Reported to the Party Central Committee, 1984"**

Position	Unit
Head, deputy heads	Bank headquarters, General Office
Directors, deputy directors	Various bureaus ( <i>ju</i> and <i>si</i> ) of Bank headquarters
Head, deputy heads	Investigation and Research Office
Head, deputy heads	Counsellors Office
Chief engineer, deputy chief engineers	Headquarters
Chief economist, deputy chief economists	Headquarters
Chief accountant, deputy chief accountants	Headquarters
Bureau-level investigators ( <i>diao yan yuan</i> ), researchers	Headquarters
Deputy heads, group members	Discipline inspection group of Bank headquarters
Party secretary, deputy secretaries	Party committee of organs of Bank headquarters
Chairman, deputy chairmen	National Bank Trade Union Work Committee
Party secretary, president	Sichuan Finance and Economics College
Party secretary, president	Hunan Finance and Economics College
Party secretary, president	Shaanxi Finance and Economics College

SOURCES: Excerpted from "Temporary Method for Managing Cadres of the People's Bank of China," in People's Bank of China Personnel Bureau, Ed., *Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian* (Selection of Personnel Work Documents), Beijing, Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, 1985, p. 10; "Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee," *ibid.*, pp. 398-405; and "Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the People's Bank of China," *ibid.*, pp. 414-16.

detailed examination of each case. A second objective in granting more autonomy to local party authorities on personnel matters, was to "spur their initiative" and lead them to appoint high-quality local officials and to supervise them efficiently. In addition, decentralization of cadre management was considered necessary to implement new economic reforms, which, among other things, emphasized increased autonomy for enterprises and other local units.<sup>22</sup>

*Central Committee list.* Since 1984, the list of positions over which the party Central Committee has authority to authorize appointments, removals, and transfers has been divided into two parts: (1) the "Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee" (*Zhonggong zhongyang guanli de ganbu zhiwu mingcheng biao*),<sup>23</sup> and (2) the "List of Cadre Positions to be Reported to the Party Central Committee" (*Xiang zhongyang beian de ganbu zhiwu mingdan*).<sup>24</sup> On the first of these lists, party authorities have placed approximately 5,000 of the most senior positions throughout the country.<sup>25</sup> Before any cadre can be appointed to or removed from one of these positions, the Central Committee (usually through its Organization Department) must give prior approval. The CC's second list has tens of thousands of positions on it—most are those just below the primary positions in the administrative hierarchy. Appointments to or removals from these positions must be reported to the Central Committee. It may be that since 1984 the provincial and lower-level party committee *nomenklatura* has similarly been divided into two lists to parallel central practice.

The 1984 list of jobs directly managed by the Central Committee is divided into a number of functional areas (see Table 2). It includes the heads and deputy heads of Central Committee departments, and of the centrally controlled party media; the leading positions in the National People's Congress, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and the courts and the procuratorate; as well as the leading positions within the State Council and its ministries, commissions, and and subordinate bureaus (*zhishu ju*). Also covered are senior positions in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the New China News Agency, and various important banks and

corporations. Senior leaders of the People's Armed Police, and ambassadors and other foreign affairs officials are also on the list.

The list extends to the leadership of all important mass organizations, including the federation of trade unions, the youth league, the women's federation, and organizations of creative workers, overseas Chinese, and friendship groups. It also covers the leaders of provincial party and government organizations (to deputy governor level); leaders of provincial people's congresses and provincial CPPCC's; and heads of provincial courts and procuratorates. The presidents and party secretaries of the top 10 academic institutions appear on the list, as do the leaders of more than 30 economic enterprises or research units. These include well-known enterprises connected with the Datong coal fields, the Anshan steel complex, the Daqing oil field, and the Shaoshan petrochemical installation, as well as a host of lesser-known enterprises in such strategically important fields as aviation, ordnance, nuclear energy, and space research. Finally, a number of well-known museums, libraries, hospitals, and medical research facilities are listed.

The second list, covering positions reportable to the CC, extends party authority further down the administrative hierarchy. This list is as comprehensive as the primary job title list, and focuses on those posts immediately below the level of leader and deputy leader of organizations identified on the primary list. In addition, it includes prefectural-level appointments, the leaders of academic institutions not on the primary list, and 52 additional economic enterprises, units, and their affiliated research institutes. Finally, it includes the heads of all corporations subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, various customs offices, additional hospitals and publishing houses, broadcasting stations, and travel services.

Every six months, party units must submit reports on the cadres holding these positions both to the Organization Department (10 copies) and to any other Central Committee department that shares responsibility for managing the position (2 copies). These reports are designed to keep the Central Committee advised of the situation with respect to local cadre management, and to help it further in supervising and promoting the develop-

<sup>22</sup>See Commentator, *Renmin Ribao*, July 20, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 23, 1984, pp. K/1-5.

<sup>23</sup>The list is published as Table 2.

<sup>24</sup>*RGWX*, pp. 405-12.

<sup>25</sup>If officials reduced the number of centrally managed cadres by two-thirds, the reform would have resulted in the Central Committee managing 4,290 cadres (one-third of the 13,000 cadres managed centrally in 1983). My estimate of approximately 5,000 positions is based on counting the

number of positions on the list and estimating the number of deputies and advisers. Because some cadres hold more than one position (e.g., the same official could be both deputy minister of a ministry and secretary of the party core group of the ministry), there should be more positions managed centrally than cadres filling them. Note that in 1983, the Central Committee planned to retain control over 7,000 cadres after the reform, substantially more than I have reported here. If, indeed, the figure is 7,000, then I would expect the list of centrally managed positions to be 7,500 or more.

ment of talented officials.<sup>26</sup>

Before 1984, the Central Committee probably exercised direct *nomenklatura* authority over those positions now on the list of reportable positions. For example, most of the positions that appeared on the 1979 CC *nomenklatura* for the People's Bank of China now appear on the list of reportable positions (see Table 1). Since 1984, provincial committees and party core groups have exercised authority to fill vacancies on this list. Presumably, in practice, the Central Committee, usually through its Organization Department, could intervene in these appointments if it wished to do so.

*Central ministry party core group lists.* At the central level, in addition to the CC's *nomenklatura*, the party core groups of the ministries and commissions of the State Council, other party and government agencies, and mass organizations maintain their own *nomenklatura* lists. These lists are divided into jobs for which the core groups must give approval and jobs upon whose filling the core groups are to receive reports.<sup>27</sup> In 1984, the *nomenklatura* of the People's Bank of China, for example, was divided into several categories. It included several tens of second-echelon positions in the headquarters on which the Bank's party core group was to report to the Central Committee's Organization Department (see Table 1). Second, it included a much longer list of other positions that the Bank headquarters (that is, the party core group) fills directly, but whose filling need not be reported to the Central Committee. A third list of positions, such as the heads of divisions and branch offices of the Bank in the provinces—also once reportable to the Central Committee—is now only reportable to the Bank headquarters (that is, to the party core group).

*Local party lists.* Although the *nomenklatura* lists of provincial and local party committees and local party core groups are not available to the author, these lists in all likelihood parallel the CC list. Provincial party committee lists probably include second-echelon positions for the provincial party committee, in addition to including, for example, senior officials of the provincial party newspaper. Senior provincial government positions,

just below the governor and deputy governor level no doubt are also included (although it is possible that the governor and his deputies are on both the central and the provincial lists). The list probably also covers senior members of the provincial judiciary and procuracy; senior prefectural party and government positions; senior positions in the provincial branches of the New China News Agency, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as well as senior leaders of provincial branches of mass organizations, banks, corporations, institutions of higher learning, important enterprises and service units; and the secretary, deputy secretaries, and members of party core groups, and the heads of discipline inspection groups of each of these institutions.

The *nomenklatura* of party core groups of central ministries, commissions, and other units in Beijing probably overlaps with the provincial party committee lists. For example, presidents, vice presidents, advisers, party core group secretaries and deputy secretaries, core group members, and the party committee secretaries and deputy secretaries of provincial branches of the People's Bank of China, which appear on the *nomenklatura* of the Bank's headquarters party core group,<sup>28</sup> may also appear on provincial party committee lists. The party core groups of the provincial branches of the Bank, in addition, have their own *nomenklatura*, which includes division and office heads of those branches.

Only scattered information exists about the scope of the *nomenklatura* of prefectural and city party committees. According to one report, these party committees are responsible for the heads and deputy heads of offices in prefectural and city government and party organs, county party committee secretaries and deputy secretaries, county people's congress standing committee chairmen, county magistrates, and county CPPCC chairmen.<sup>29</sup> Also included must be the heads and deputy heads of mass organizations, educational institutions, and economic and service units under prefectural and city jurisdiction.

*Scope of the Chinese and Soviet nomenklaturas.* In many respects, the scope of the *nomenklatura* lists of Chinese and Soviet party central committees are similar. Both contain senior positions in the CC departments; senior party and state positions down to provincial level; senior public security appointments; senior positions in the mass media and mass organizations; senior diplomats; senior judicial officials; and leaders of

<sup>26</sup>The contents of the reports should include: "cadre particulars (name, sex, age, nationality, years at work, time of entering the party, cultural [educational] level, political orientation, occupation); the cadre appointment/removal report-form; and investigation materials." See Central Committee Organization Department, "Notice on the Revision of the Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee, 1984," *RGWX*, p. 397.

<sup>27</sup>For an example of the *nomenklatura* of the People's Bank of China, see "Job Title List of the Cadres Managed by the People's Bank of China, 1984," in *RGWX*, pp. 414-16.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup>Radio Nanning, Nov. 30, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 3, 1984, p. P/3.

**Table 2: Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (1984)**

1. PARTY CENTRAL	
Position	Unit
Secretary general	Party Central Advisory Committee
Secretary general	Central Discipline Inspection Commission
Secretary, committee members, secretary general	Central Commission of Political Science and Law
Head, deputy heads, members	Party Central Leading Small Groups ( <i>lingdao xiaozu</i> )
Director, deputy directors	Party Central General Office
Head, deputy heads	Party Central Committee departments
President, vice presidents	Party Central School
Director, deputy directors	Party Secretariat Research Office
Director, deputy directors	Party Secretariat Rural Policy Research Office
Director, deputy directors	Party Literature Research Center
Director, deputy directors	Party History Research Center
Chairman, deputy chairmen	Commission for Collecting Party Historical Data
Director, deputy directors	Bureau for Translating Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin
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Editor-in-chief, deputy editors-in-chief	<i>Hongqi</i>
Editor-in-chief, deputy editors-in-chief	<i>Guangming Ribao</i>
Director, editor-in-chief, deputy editors-in-chief	<i>China Daily</i>
Secretary, deputy secretaries	Party Committee of Organs directly under the Central Committee
Secretary, deputy secretaries	Party Committee of Central State Organs
Secretary general	Discipline Inspection Committee of the Party Committee of Departments under the Central Committee
Secretary general	Discipline Inspection Committee of the Party Committee of Central State Organs
Advisers	(For all the above units)
2. NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (NPC), CHINESE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE (CPPCC), JUDICIARY, PROCURATORATE	
Position	Unit
Chairman, deputy chairmen, members, secretary general, deputy secretaries general	Standing Committee of NPC
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of NPC Standing Committee
Chairmen, deputy chairmen	Specialized committees of NPC Standing Committee
Chairman, deputy chairmen	Legislative Affairs Commission of NPC
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Legislative Affairs Commission of NPC
Chairman, deputy chairmen, members Standing Committee, secretary general, deputy secretaries general	National Committee of CPPCC
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of CPPCC National Committee
President, vice presidents	Supreme People's Court
Members	Judicial Committee of Supreme People's Court
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of the Judicial Committee of Supreme People's Court
Procurator general, deputy procurators general	Supreme People's Procuratorate
Members	Procuratorial Committee of Supreme People's Procuratorate
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Procuratorial Committee of Supreme People's Procuratorate
Advisers	(For all the above units)

## 3. STATE COUNCIL, BANKS, CORPORATIONS, POLICE, DIPLOMATS

Position	Unit
Premier, deputy premiers, councillors	State Council
Secretary general, deputy secretaries general	Secretary General's Office of State Council
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Secretary General's Office of State Council
Ministers, vice ministers	Ministries and commissions of State Council
Auditor general, deputy auditors general	Auditing Administration of State Council
Chairman, deputy chairmen, president, vice presidents	People's Bank of China
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core groups of ministries, commissions, offices, and banks
Heads	Discipline inspection groups of ministries, commissions, offices, and banks
Heads	Political departments ( <i>zhengzhibu</i> ), where established, of ministries, commissions, offices, and banks
President, vice presidents	Chinese Academy of Sciences
President, vice presidents	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Head	Discipline inspection group of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Secretary, deputy secretary, members	Party core group of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Head	Discipline inspection group of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Director general, deputy directors general	New China News Agency (Xinhua)
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Xinhua
Head	Discipline inspection group of Xinhua
Director, deputy directors	Staff offices directly subordinate to State Council
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members	Party core groups of staff offices directly subordinate to State Council
Heads	Discipline inspection groups of staff offices directly subordinate to State Council
Director, deputy directors	Bureaus subordinate to State Council ( <i>zhishu ju</i> )
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members	Party core groups of bureaus subordinate to State Council
Heads	Discipline inspection groups of bureaus subordinate to State Council
Heads	Political departments of bureaus subordinate to State Council
Head	State Councillors' Office
Chairmen and deputy chairmen of boards of directors, chief auditors, presidents, vice presidents	Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, People's Construction Bank, Bank of China, People's Insurance Corporation of China
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members	Party core groups of the above banks and corporation
Heads	Discipline inspection groups of above banks and corporation
Chairmen, deputy chairmen, general managers, deputy general managers	China State Shipbuilding Corp., China National Petrochemicals Corp., China International Transportation Corp., China International Trust and Investment Corp.
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members	Party core groups of above four corporations
Heads	Discipline inspection groups of above four corporations
Chairman, deputy chairmen	Everbright Industrial Corp.
Chairman, deputy chairmen, general manager, deputy general managers	China National Nonferrous Metals Industrial Corp.
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of China National Nonferrous Metals Industrial Corp.
Head	Discipline inspection group of China National Nonferrous Metals Industrial Corp.
Chairmen, general managers	China National Offshore Oil Corp., China Construction Industry Corp., China Automotive Industry Corp., China Silk Industry Corp., China Tobacco Industry Corp., China Packaging Corp.
Secretaries	Party core groups of above six corporations
Advisers	(For all the above units)

(Table continued on pages 44-45)

**Table 2: Job Title List** (continued)

Secretary, deputy secretaries	Party committee of headquarters of Chinese People's Armed Police
Commander, deputy commanders, and heads and deputy heads of political committee	Headquarters of Chinese People's Armed Police
Chief of Staff, head of Political Dept., head of political committee of Political Dept., head of Logistics Dept., head of political committee of Logistics Dept.	Headquarters of Chinese People's Armed Police
Ambassadors	Chinese embassies
Heads of legations	Chinese legations
Consuls general	Chinese consulates general
Representatives, deputy representatives	China's Permanent Mission to the United Nations (UN)
Representatives, deputy representatives	UN organs
Head	Singapore Commercial Representative's Office

4. MASS ORGANIZATIONS

Position	Unit
President, vice presidents	All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)
First secretary, secretaries	Secretariat of ACFTU
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of ACFTU
First secretary, secretaries, alternate secretaries	Secretariat of Central Committee of Chinese Communist Youth League
President, vice presidents	All-China Federation of Women
First secretary, secretaries	Secretariat of All-China Federation of Women
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of All-China Federation of Women
Chairman, deputy chairmen	China Association for Science and Technology
Secretary	Secretariat of China Association for Science and Technology
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of China Association for Science and Technology
Chairman, deputy chairmen	China Federation of Literary and Art Circles
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of China Federation of Literary and Art Circles
President, vice presidents	All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese
Chairman, deputy chairmen	Chinese Writers' Association
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Chinese Writers' Association
President, vice president	Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries
Chairman, deputy chairmen	Chinese Council for Promotion of International Trade
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members	Party core group of Chinese Council for Promotion of International Trade
Advisers	(For all the above units)

5. LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

Position	Unit
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, standing committee members	Party committees of provinces, centrally administered cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin), and autonomous regions
Secretary, deputy secretaries, standing committee members	Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee
Heads, deputy heads	Party advisory commissions of provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
Secretaries, deputy secretaries	Discipline inspection commissions of provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
Governors, deputy governors	Provinces
Mayors, deputy mayors	Centrally administered cities
Chairmen, deputy chairmen	Autonomous regions
Advisers	(For all above governors, mayors, and chairmen)

Chairmen, deputy chairmen	Standing committees of people's congresses of provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
Chairmen, deputy chairmen	Chinese people's political consultative conferences of provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
Presidents	Higher-level people's courts of provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
Chief procurators	People's procuratorates of provinces, centrally administered cities, and autonomous regions
6. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING	
Position	Unit
Party secretaries, presidents	Chinese People's University, Qinghua University, Peking University, Beijing Teacher's University, Fudan University, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Xian Jiaotong University, Beijing Agricultural University, Beijing Medical College, Chinese Science and Technology University
7. ENTERPRISES AND SERVICE UNITS	
Position	Unit
Party secretaries, managers	First and Second Automobile Manufacturing factories, First and Second Heavy Machinery factories
Party secretaries, presidents	No. 9 Research Institute [nuclear industry]
Party secretaries, managers	Songling and Liming Machinery companies [aviation industry]
Party secretaries, managers	No. 4400 and No. 714 factories [electronics industry]
Party secretaries, managers	No. 447 and No. 617 factories [ordnance industry]
Party secretary, manager	First Research Institute [space industry]
Party secretary, manager	Jilin Chemical Industry Company
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, bureau head, deputy bureau heads, chief engineer, chief accountant, chief economist	Datong Coal Service Bureau
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, manager, deputy managers, chief engineer, chief accountant, chief economist	Anshan Steel Corporation
Party secretaries, managers	Capital, Wuhan, and Baoshan Steel corporations
Party secretary, president	Steel Research Institute
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, bureau head, deputy bureau heads, chief engineer, chief accountant, chief economist	Daqing Petroleum Management Bureau
Party secretary, director	Shengli Oil Field
Party secretaries, managers	No. 426 and No. 436 factories [shipbuilding]
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, manager, deputy managers, chief engineer, chief accountant, chief economist	Shaoshan Petrochemical Industry Corporation
Party secretary, manager	Shanghai Petrochemical Industry Corporation
Party secretary, president	Petrochemicals Research Institute
Party secretaries, managers	Zhengzhou Aluminum Factory, Jinchuan Nonferrous Metals Corp.
Party secretary, president	Institute of Nonferrous Metals Research
Party secretary, president	Geological Sciences Research Institute
Party secretary, head	Beijing Railway Bureau
Party secretary, president	Railway Scientific Research Institute
Party secretary, deputy secretaries, president, vice presidents	Chinese Agricultural Science Institute
Party secretaries, heads	Imperial Palace Museum, Museum of Chinese History, Museum of the Chinese Revolution, Beijing Library
Party secretaries, heads	Chinese Academy of Medicine, Chinese Medical Research Institute, Beijing Hospital, Capital Hospital, Chinese Center for Preventative Medicine
President	Central Institute of Socialism

SOURCE: "Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee," in People's Bank of China Personnel Bureau, Ed., *Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian* (Selection of Personnel Work Documents), Beijing, Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, 1985, pp. 398-405.

key economic enterprises.<sup>30</sup> Further, in both the Soviet and the Chinese systems, as a rule, party units exercise *nomenklatura* authority one level down the administrative hierarchy.<sup>31</sup> Finally, both systems operate primary and secondary lists.

The primary list contains positions staffed directly by the party unit. In China, the secondary list is a list of positions that must be reported to the party unit, whereas in the Soviet Union, the secondary list "consists of positions the staffing of which is another organization's primary responsibility . . . , but such appointments are made in consultation with the given party unit."<sup>32</sup> In practice, there may be little difference between the two kinds of secondary lists.

Although the scope of both lists is broad, the Soviet and Chinese *nomenklaturas* differ in several significant respects. First, the Chinese list, unlike the Soviet list, omits positions in the armed forces. Senior military positions in China appear on a separate list maintained by the party Central Military Commission. In the Soviet Union, "the general staff as well as senior staff of the Main Political Administration Directorate, political officers (down to the level of corps, division, and naval squadrons), and probably some military commanders are found on the CC list."<sup>33</sup>

Second, the Soviet list includes elected members of the Central Committee while the Chinese list does not. The position of the elected members may be included on a separate senior party job title list, maintained by the CCP's Secretariat or Politburo.<sup>34</sup> The addition of military personnel and members of the Central Committee would probably inflate the figure of China's centrally controlled *nomenklatura* by several thousand.

Finally, in China, apparently unlike in the Soviet Union, some delegates to the people's congresses have been covered by the *nomenklatura* system. In 1981, for example, the Chinese party Central Committee's *nomenklatura* included "patriotic personages" among the delegates to the National People's Congress and to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.<sup>35</sup> Control over these delegates, however, does not ap-

<sup>30</sup>Although the Soviet party Central Committee list has never been published, some positions on it have been identified. See Harasymiw, *Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union*, London, Macmillan, 1984, p. 163.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 163-67.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 161.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 163.

<sup>34</sup>Members of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, the Central Advisory Commission, and the Central Military Commission may also be on this higher-level *nomenklatura*.

<sup>35</sup>Central Committee Organization Department and Central Committee United Front Work Department, "On the Request for Instructions on the Shared Management of Cadres by the Central Committee United Front Work Department," RGWX, p. 348.

**Table 3: Estimated Size of the Chinese Communist Party's *Nomenklatura*, 1982<sup>1</sup>**

Category	Number
State organs and other work organs	894,910
Party and mass organs	1,286,251
Municipal street organs and rural people's communes	396,475
Enterprises, service units, and other work organs	5,553,151
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>8,130,787</b>

<sup>1</sup>These are the numbers of "responsible people" (*fuzeren*) employed in each category.

SOURCE: State Council Population Census Office and State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population Statistics, Eds., *Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha cailliao* (1982 Population Census of China), Beijing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1985, p. 448.

pear on the 1984 CC list discussed above, and may now have passed to party core groups of the standing committees of the two institutions.

Although the total number of posts on the CCP's *nomenklatura* has never been published, it is possible to deduce its rough size. The provincial lists are probably as long as the Central Committee job title list, because most of the central institutions covered by the list have provincial counterparts. At lower levels, however, there may be fewer positions on the list. One gross indicator of the total number of covered positions was published in the 1982 census. Authorities identified 8.1 million "responsible people" (*fuzeren*), or leaders, who were employed by party and government organizations, service units, and economic enterprises (see Table 3). Given the scope of the system as revealed by the Central Committee job title list, this figure provides some indication of the numbers involved. No references to more precise figures, or references to the size of the provincial and local *nomenklatura* have been published. In the Soviet Union, Bohdan Harasymiw estimates, the CPSU Central Committee's *nomenklatura* extends to 51,000 positions,<sup>36</sup> or roughly ten times the number of posts covered since 1984 by the Chinese party's CC job title list. Although there are some differences in the scope of coverage, the figures suggest that the party in the Soviet Union exercises a more highly centralized control over personnel management than does the Chinese party. Because of the very large size of the CPSU CC list, *nomenklatura* authority is shared among the Central Committee's many departments.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>36</sup>Bohdan Harasymiw, *Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union*, p. 163. This figure presumably includes the military and delegates to the CPSU Central Committee. See the discussion below.

<sup>37</sup>Writing in 1983, Harasymiw identified 17 departments, which included party and organizational work, agitation and propaganda, education, and (fn. continued on p. 47)

Total *nomenklatura* coverage as a percentage of the labor force is probably roughly equivalent in the two countries, however. T. H. Rigby estimates that the Soviet system covers approximately 2 million positions or 1.5–2 percent of the labor force.<sup>38</sup> My estimate of 8 million *nomenklatura* positions in China represents 1.5 percent of the Chinese labor force.<sup>39</sup>

*List of reserves.* A final component of the *nomenklatura* system is a list of reserve cadres called the "Leading Cadre Reserve List" (*lingdao ganbu houbei mingdan*), which records the names of cadres thought suitable to fill vacancies on the job title list. Each party committee with *nomenklatura* authority maintains such a list. The names of those officials proposed by lower levels for transfer to higher-level positions are placed on the reserve list of the higher-level party committee after the latter has given its approval.<sup>40</sup>

The size of the reserve list must be larger than the *nomenklatura* itself, or more than 8 million cadres, if my speculation is correct. As a result of administrative reforms undertaken since 1982, nearly one million elderly officials have been replaced, and party leaders have promoted younger leaders to fill their positions. In this process, the authorities have focused their attention on a much smaller group of potential successors than the entire reserve list. In the mid-1980's, the CC's Organization Department announced that it had placed 1,000 "middle-aged and young" officials on its reserve list for appointment to ministerial- and provincial-level positions. Prefectural-level reserve lists contain the names of another 20,000 officials, while authorities have identi-

fied a further 100,000 cadres as reserves at the county level.<sup>41</sup> Special training programs have been created to prepare these cadres for promotion.

Party officials are encouraged to make *personal* recommendations of cadres to fill the reserve list. According to the 1983 Organization Department handbook, "failing to recommend the qualified people one knows . . . [is] counterproductive to the cause of the party and the people."<sup>42</sup> To guarantee appointment of committed, loyal, and trustworthy successors, the party must rely on the personal advice of serving officials. In the party's view, to rely only on a candidate's qualifications on paper, without intimate knowledge of the person, can result in the employment of tricksters and charlatans.

Although party membership is not strictly a precondition for a position on the reserve list, most *nomenklatura* posts probably go to party members. In 1980, for example, all heads of State Council ministries and commissions were party members, and only three vice ministers, ten ministerial-level advisers, and three percent of bureau heads were not party members.<sup>43</sup> University graduates and young and middle-aged officials now make up an increasing number of reserve cadres,<sup>44</sup> but the majority of them probably are party members too.

## Institutions

According to past practice, a senior party leader within the Politburo supervises organization and personnel work. By 1980, control of personnel matters was formally vested in a secretary-level position in the reestablished party Secretariat.<sup>45</sup> The post-Cultural Revolution Central Committee has vested principal control of the *nomenklatura* system in its Organization Department (*zuzhibu*), headed in 1987 by Song Ping. In the mid-1980's, the department was composed of a number of

industry and transport. Each, he estimated, could manage from 1,000 to 5,000 officials. See *ibid.*, pp. 162–63. China's pre-Cultural Revolution Central Committee included departments with responsibility for the economy. These departments, which, according to Barnett, had responsibility for the *nomenklatura* in their own areas, were abolished in the Cultural Revolution. See Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 5, 22.

<sup>38</sup>T. H. Rigby, "Introduction," in Rigby and Harasymiw, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>39</sup>As of the 1982 census, the labor force consisted of approximately 522 million people. See State Council Population Census Office and State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population Statistics, Eds. *Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha cailiao* (1982 Population Census of China), Beijing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1985, p. 373.

<sup>40</sup>See Central Committee Organization Department, Ed., *Dangde zuzhi gongzuo wenda* (Questions and Answers on Party Organization Work—hereafter, *Questions and Answers*), Beijing, Renmin chubanshe, 1983, trans. in Melanie Manion, "Cadre Recruitment and Management in the People's Republic of China," *CLG*, Fall 1984, p. 36. This handbook is a compilation of guidelines and policies governing the general operation of the party as well as the specific party functions of cadre management. It provides relatively detailed information on cadre recruitment criteria, training and evaluation methods, contents and maintenance of personnel dossiers, lines of authority over cadres and veteran cadre management.

<sup>41</sup>For a discussion of China's *nomenklatura* system based on this material, see Manion, "The Cadre Management System Post-Mao . . ." *loc. cit.*, pp. 203–33.

<sup>41</sup>Xinhua, Sept. 7, 1985, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 9, 1985, p. K/2; and Xinhua, Sept. 10, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 10, 1984, p. K/12.

<sup>42</sup>*Questions and Answers*, *loc. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>43</sup>Central Committee United Front Work Department and Central Committee Organization Department, "Report of Opinions on the Current and Future Situation of Arranging for Personalities Outside the Party to Assume Leading Positions in State Organs, 1980," in Ministry of Labor and Personnel, Ed., *Zhishi fenzi zhengce wenjian huibian* (Selection of Documents on Intellectuals' Work), Beijing, Laodong renshi chubanshe, 1983, p. 77.

<sup>44</sup>For reviews of the 1982 administrative reforms and their impact on the educational level and age of party and state officials, see Christopher M. Clarke, "China's Revolution in Administrative Structure: Implementing Central Party and State Reforms in Post-Mao China," in David M. Lampton, Ed., *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1987; also John P. Burns, "Reforming China's Bureaucracy, 1979–1982," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), June 1983, pp. 692–722.

<sup>45</sup>See *Dongxiang* (Hong Kong), April 1980.

bureaus with obvious personnel functions.<sup>46</sup> Separate bureaus exist to manage cadres who worked for central institutions in Beijing; to manage cadres employed locally (now probably only at provincial level); to promote the further education of cadres; to arrange the employment of economic (e.g., finance and trade), youth, and veteran cadres; to handle cadre transfers; and to maintain the personnel files for those on the CC's *nomenklatura*, those filling positions reportable to the CC, or those on its list of leading cadre reserves.<sup>47</sup>

Since 1980, the Organization Department has shared management authority over the CC's *nomenklatura* with the Propaganda and United Front Work departments, as it did in the 1950's. By 1980, the Propaganda Department resumed control of the *nomenklatura* of party newspapers such as *Renmin Ribao* and *Guangming Ribao*, the news agencies, the Ministry of Culture, and various literary and art associations.<sup>48</sup> At the same time, authorities placed leading positions of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, and various nationalities affairs and religious bodies on the *nomenklatura* of the United Front Work Department.<sup>49</sup> Nevertheless, under these arrangements:

*the Central Committee Organization Department continues to manage general research on the policy of cadre management work, the rectification and reform of the cadre management system, the detachment and transfer of cadres in batches by various systems, the establishment of cadre dossier systems, cadre statistical work, and general reporting of the appointment and removal of centrally managed cadres.*<sup>50</sup>

As we have seen, in addition to the Central Committee departments, the party core groups organized in all administrative units throughout the country play an important role in the implementation of the *nomenklatura* system.

At provincial and local levels, organization bureaus of party committees<sup>51</sup> maintain the provincial and local *nomenklatura* and lists of reserve cadres to fill these posts. They approve personnel changes for positions falling within the purview of their authority. The organization structure of these bureaus parallels the structure of the CC's Organization Department. Just as the latter shares cadre management with other CC departments and with party core groups, so local organization bureaus share management authority with other bureaus of local party committees and with local party core groups. In Guangxi, for example, the provincial party committee authorized its propaganda and united front work bureaus and its general office to share cadre manage-

ment duties. In addition, the party core groups of the provincial economic, planning, construction, science and technology, and foreign economic relations and trade committees, as well as the regional government general office have *nomenklatura* authority over subordinate units.<sup>52</sup>

### Process

The positions covered by the *nomenklatura* are both appointive and elective. In the January 1983 handbook of the Central Committee's Organization Department, the standard procedures to be followed by units wishing to make an appointment to a *nomenklatura* position are also spelled out:

*A request for approval should be submitted to the higher government, in the name of the administrative organ, at the same time as the application report on a "cadre appointment or removal application form" is submitted to the party committee at the higher level. After the higher party committee examines and approves the application report, its organization department notifies the personnel department of the government in whose name the application report was submitted. According to the regulations, this government reports the matter to the government at the higher level, which then makes the appointment or removal.*<sup>53</sup>

Based on these procedures, to fill the post of deputy head of a bureau in the headquarters of the People's Bank of China (on the *nomenklatura* of the party core group of the Bank since 1984), the bureau head would first submit a recommendation for appointment to both

<sup>46</sup>See *China Directory 1987*, Tokyo, Radiopress, Inc., 1986, p. 20.

<sup>47</sup>The Organization Department apparently also controls the personnel files of "some renowned scientists, technological experts, artists, writers, professors, actors, and athletes who have made important contributions," although they may not hold a position on the *nomenklatura*. See *Questions and Answers*, p. 93.

<sup>48</sup>Central Committee Organization Department and Central Committee Propaganda Department, "Notice Relating to the Shared Management of Cadres by the Central Committee Propaganda Department, 1980," trans. in Burns, "Contemporary China's *Nomenklatura* System," loc. cit.

<sup>49</sup>"Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee, 1980," *RGWX*, pp. 349-51.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 348.

<sup>51</sup>The Central Committee's Organization Department and the organization bureaus of lower-level party committees are linked by professional relations (*yewu guanxi*), not leadership relations (*lingdao guanxi*). The Organization Department cannot issue orders to lower-level organization bureaus. Orders can only come through local party committees. See Barnett, op. cit., pp. 148-49.

<sup>52</sup>Radio Nanning, Nov. 30, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 3, 1984, p. P/2.

<sup>53</sup>*Questions and Answers*, loc. cit., p. 82.

the party core group and the Bank headquarters. The recommended candidate is drawn from the list of reserves for the position, which would include division heads within the bureau, and perhaps a division deputy head, and one or two outsiders. After the party core group has reviewed and approved the appointment, it notifies the personnel bureau of the Bank. The bureau then notifies the Bank headquarters, which makes the appointment. Also, because the post is on the CC's list of reportable positions, the party core group notifies the CC Organization Department of the appointment.

Authorities have also worked out procedures to handle cases of *nomenklatura* overlap. In general, higher-level party committees have final authority in these cases. For example, before the 1984 decentralization, heads of provincial branches of the People's Bank of China appeared on the *nomenklatura* of both the CC and the provincial party committees. According to 1979 guidelines, the party core group of the Bank headquarters first recommended a cadre for the post. This was then discussed with the provincial party committee until agreement was reached. Then the party core group submitted the name to the CC Organization Department for approval. When this was received, the headquarters (presumably, its personnel bureau) submitted the name to the State Council, which made the formal appointment.<sup>54</sup> Because the 1984 reforms replaced the two-level-down principle with one-level-down, the extent of *nomenklatura* overlap has been greatly reduced.

Many of the positions on the CC's *nomenklatura* are elected. These include senior positions on the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the National Committee of the CPPCC. In addition, the NPC elects the premier, vice premiers, and councillors of the State Council, and its ministers, auditor general, and secretary general. It also elects the heads of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate. Provincial people's congresses also elect provincial officials; congresses of mass organizations elect their own officials, and so on. Yet, before the elections take place, the list of nominees must be submitted to the relevant party committee for approval.<sup>55</sup> The party

uses the *nomenklatura* to screen candidates, and thus to control the outcome of elections. This role for the party is not acknowledged in public documents, such as the state constitution, the 1979 election law, or the organization laws on local government.

## Conclusion

For students of Chinese politics, the *nomenklatura* system is significant because it is the instrument of party control of leadership selection in institutions throughout the country. The job title lists demonstrate that the scope of party control is wider than generally imagined. The Central Committee, for example, and its United Front Work Department manage leading cadre positions on the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council, including its party core group. On the *nomenklatura* of the party core group of the bureau are the heads, deputy heads, and secretary generals of various national religious organizations.<sup>56</sup> Through party core groups, then, the party extends its control of personnel administration very widely.

Further, the *nomenklatura* provides an authoritative measure of the official status of various organizations in China. First, for an organization to be omitted from the Central Committee list is an indication of its lower status, and of the fact that it is probably less well connected to party officials in Beijing than are those organizations included on the list.

Second, the number of positions within any one organization that appears on the *nomenklatura* is an indication of the organization's status. For example, because the Academy of Sciences is part of the State Council, outsiders assume that it has a higher status than, say, Peking University. They are, of course, correct. Just how much higher the Academy's status is can be demonstrated by the CC job title list, which includes the institution's president and vice presidents; its party core group secretary, deputy secretaries, and members; and the head of its discipline inspection group (see Table 2). In addition, scores of positions within the Academy appear on the list of positions reportable to the CC. By contrast, only the president and party secretary of Peking University appear on the CC's *nomenklatura*, and no additional positions are reportable to the CC.<sup>57</sup>

Further comparisons can be made. In Hong Kong, the chairman and vice chairmen of Everbright Corporation are on the Central Committee's *nomenklatura*, while senior positions in the China Resources Corporation, long thought in Hong Kong to be very powerful, belong only to the party core group of a central ministry. Rank ordering of other economic enterprises is also possible from

<sup>54</sup>"Opinion on Strengthening the Cadre Management of the People's Bank of China," in *RGWX*, p. 25; *Questions and Answers*, loc. cit., pp. 84-85.

<sup>55</sup>*Questions and Answers*, loc. cit., p. 86.

<sup>56</sup>These are: the Buddhist Association of China, the China Islamic Association, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee of Protestant Churches, the Christian Council of China, the China Patriotic Catholic Association, the National Administrative Commission of the Chinese Catholic Church, and the China Taoist Association. See "Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the United Front Work Department of the Party Central Committee," in *RGWX*, pp. 349-51.

<sup>57</sup>Many additional positions from Peking University would appear on the *nomenklatura* of the party core group of the State Education Commission, however.

the lists. The *nomenklatura* provides an authoritative clue to China's leaders' perceptions of which organizations are of most strategic or economic importance.

Finally, the lists provide additional evidence of the the central party's urban bias. The CC controls positions located mostly in China's major cities. Because of their lesser strategic or economic importance, organizations in the countryside have been assigned, for purposes of cadre control, to lower-level party committees.

For the system itself, however, the *nomenklatura* is significant because it encourages the development among the leadership of patron-client relations. In general, power, status, and wealth in China go to those who can climb the ladder of official position. Because there is no real alternative to employment outside of the "mono-organizational"<sup>58</sup> cadre hierarchy, and because officials are almost completely dependent on their official sinecures for their livelihood, they need patrons at higher levels of the bureaucracy, particularly those who are well-connected to party committees and party core groups, in order to further their careers. The *nomenklatura* system institutionalizes patronage, and indicates to clients where they should look for support. As T. H. Rigby has observed of the USSR and Eastern Europe:

*Because of the nomenklatura system, one of the resources, and surely the most valuable one—subject to administrative decision and, therefore, forming part of the stock of reciprocal favor—is position itself. Senior officials . . . are consequently much courted as "patrons" and are in a position to exact from their "clients" loyal service and reciprocal favors both on the official and personal levels.*<sup>59</sup>

The Chinese *nomenklatura* system is similarly suited to patronage politics. First, it centralizes authority over the national personnel system in the party. Although the party is not monolithic, its dominant role in personnel matters confines the search for patrons to those within the party. The 1984 reforms decentralized personnel power within the party, but did not transfer such authority to non-party units.

Second, the Chinese system endorses personal recommendation as the best method of filling organizational positions. Abuses like factionalism, nepotism, and localism can be easily accommodated in such practice. At least in the early 1980's, because the personal approval of vice premiers or other leading officials of party central was required before appointments to "A" grade

positions could be made, the system placed these senior leaders in an excellent position to become heads of patronage networks. The 1984 decentralization means that the search for patrons or clients need concentrate only on the next higher or lower administrative level.

In practice, the Central Committee's role in leadership selection may be less pervasive than the formal system indicates. Because of the vast number of positions involved, the central leaders in Beijing cannot be personally acquainted with each case. They depend on recommendations of local officials and others on the scene. As a result, in normal times, the CC's *nomenklatura* authority may be a formality. In practice, the central figures may intervene only in exceptional circumstances, for example, when recommending authorities disagree on an appointment.

From the party's point of view, it has been necessary to retain some form of *nomenklatura* control. As a result, the party has tolerated patronage and other abuses, while attempting to control the distribution of patronage and limit its worst excesses. For economic development, however, further decentralization of personnel management is undoubtedly required. Directors of enterprises and heads of academic institutions, on whom economic development depends, need the autonomy to select personnel based on job performance rather than on party or personal loyalty. Indeed, in recent times, they have been among the first to demand that the party retreat from its tight control of personnel matters. Because party core groups in government central ministries and provincial bureaus vet leaders of enterprises and service units within their functional area, reform of leadership selection has focused on party/government relations.

In November 1987 the 13th Party Congress endorsed plans to reduce the size of the Central Committee's *nomenklatura* and to further decentralize cadre management. First, authorities called for the "gradual elimination" of the party core groups<sup>60</sup> now found in central and local government organs and in mass organizations. Because the leaders of government agencies and mass organizations often also are secretaries of party core groups within their unit, this reform will eliminate the overlap and thus rationalize *nomenklatura* control. If all party core groups are eliminated, the party Central Committee's *nomenklatura* could be reduced by up to 1,000 positions.

Second, party authorities announced a plan to establish a civil service system for state administration.

<sup>58</sup>The term is Rigby's. See T. H. Rigby, "Introduction," in Rigby and Harasymiw, op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>60</sup>See Zhao Ziyang's speech to the 13th CCP Congress, "On Advancing Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," *Wenhui Bao* (Hong Kong), Oct. 26, 1987, p. 11.

According to Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang's Work Report, civil servants (*guojia gongwuyuan*) will be divided into two categories: political affairs officers (*zhengwu gongwuyuan*), on fixed tenure appointments, who will be recommended as candidates for government posts to people's congresses by the Central Committee and local party committees; and professional officers (*yewu gongwuyuan*), on permanent appointments, who will be publicly recruited through examinations. The authorities will establish civil service institutions to manage the new system.<sup>61</sup>

Finally, party leaders proposed cutting back the dominant role that party committees now play in state leadership selection. The party would continue to manage "leading personnel of party organizations and work personnel of party organs," while civil service institutions would manage "leading personnel and work personnel of organs of state power, and judicial and procuratorial organs." Rather vaguely, the Work Report proposes that leadership selection in mass organizations, economic enterprises, and service units, now controlled by the party, would be managed according to the rules and regulations of these organizations.

Party officials maintain that these measures are necessary to increase government efficiency. They argue that reducing the party's role in leadership selection will encourage heads of government agencies to make personnel appointments based on job performance. In addition, economic enterprises and service units, now managed by party core groups, will also be able to adopt more rational, performance-based criteria in their personnel appointments. Finally, abolishing party core groups in government and mass organizations will reduce duplication and, thus, facilitate streamlining.

Although the reform, if implemented, would limit the role of the party in leadership selection, the proposals leave intact the party's dominant position. By retaining the power to "recommend" (*tuijian*) the appointment of cadres to the highest positions of state power (including presumably any new civil service organs), and the power to recommend political affairs officials throughout the civil service, the party retains *nomenklatura* authority over the state. Second, it is likely that one of the functions of the political affairs officers will be to implement party control of personnel matters. Third, if the limited experi-

ments with open recruitment which some local authorities have carried out since the mid-1980's are any indication, then party committees will retain the right to vet candidates who have passed examinations before they are offered employment contracts for professional posts.<sup>62</sup> Finally, the influential role that party committees play in all other aspects of personnel administration—determining the criteria for civil service employment, participating in performance appraisals, drafting disciplinary codes, and approving compensation levels—is likely to continue.

Beyond calling for more decentralization, the Work Report says little about changing the method of selecting leaders of educational institutions, mass organizations, economic enterprises, and service units. Presumably the Central Committee will continue to play a role. If authorities gradually eliminate party core groups, as Zhao Ziyang proposes, heads of institutions previously controlled by the groups may have more power to make appointments. It is likely, however, that the heads of the most important of these institutions will continue to be on the party's *nomenklatura*.

The proposals of the 13th Party Congress call for a reduced role for the party in leadership selection. They do not, however, remove the party from personnel administration, nor do they dismantle the *nomenklatura* system. Rather, they further limit the number of positions over which party committees have *nomenklatura* authority, and they force party committees to use more indirect means, such as administrative law and personnel policy, to influence leadership selection.

Opposition to the reform can be expected from several quarters. Party core group members, for example, may resist the reduction of their authority, which will then be tied more directly to their position in the state bureaucracy. If an open recruitment system is adopted for professionals, party committees, too, may oppose the reduction in their discretionary power over personnel appointments that such a system would entail. Thus, a discussion of the extent of the implementation of the reforms must await further developments.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>62</sup>See John P. Burns, "Civil Service Reform in Post-Mao China," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (Canberra), forthcoming.

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Annual indices for Volumes IV-to-date appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954).